In these discussions it seems the word "physical" is always taken for granted to mean something so obvious it doesn't need any description at all.

Often, when pressed, phenomenological descriptions of the physical world are given. For example, when challenged, even academic philosophers will say, "if you don't believe in anything physical, go stand in front of a train."

When it is pointed out that they are describing a moment of phenomenal experience, they'll acknowledge that as used by physicists, "physical" (much like words such as energy, gravity, magnetism) is NOT something experienced but rather a quantitative abstraction from sense data (ie phenomenological experience).

So it seems odd to hear physicalists object to panpsychism by an appeal to something ("physical") which is only known by virtue of phenomenological experience.

Do you have any description of what is meant by "physical properties" that goes beyond the abstract usage of these terms by physicists?

Also, is "information" anything more than an abstraction based on physicists' observation of patterns of behavior of sense data?