I’m aware of Mach and the rest of what you’ve cited. I see I collapsed a lot of points into too few words. It might have been better to say it was assumed to be implicit.

You’ve brought it out explicitly in your comment that you don’t want a definition of physical properties that go beyond the definitions of physicists.

So, I’ll sum up what I’ve said so far, which I don’t see you’ve addressed at all in yoru comments. Note I AM again summing up, so I suppose a lot is assumed to be obvious:

The Physicalist position: We begin with sense data (ie experience) and from that we extrapolate certain quantitative aspects. We call those quantitative aspects “physical properties.”

Therefore, “physicalism” is the view that takes abstract concepts to be the source of experience.

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I don’t see anything in what you’ve written, or in anything any physicalist in the past 100 years has said, which fundamentally contradicts what I just wrote.

If you want to see an elegant exposition of the incoherence of this and all physicalist views, I recommend Parts 1 and 2 of Bernardo Kastrup’s free online Analytic Idealism course. I hasten to add I THOROUGHLY disagree with almost all of Bernardo’s philosophy (I’m NOT an idealist) but his deconstruction of physicalism is quite well done. A good nondualist would observe that the view of how the brain constructs experience that he presents — which is actually the mainstream physicalist view — is also incoherent, but that doesn’t detract from his very precise and accurate depiction of the incoherence of all physicalist views.

The physicalist start with experience, abstract purely quantitative data, and then declare that data (as in integrated information theory that’s popular these days) is the very foundation of the universe!